A negotiation process by 2 agents e1 and e2 can be interleaved by another negotiation process between, say, e1 and e3. The interleaving may alter the resource allocation assumed at the inception of the first negotiation process. Existing proposals for argumentation-based negotiations have focused primarily on two-agent bilateral negotiations, but scarcely on the concurrency of multi-agent negotiations. To fill the gap, we present a novel argumentation theory, basing its development on abstract persuasion argumentation (which is an abstract argumentation formalism with a dynamic relation). Incorporating into it numerical information and a mechanism of handshakes among members of the dynamic relation, we show that the extended theory adapts well to concurrent multi-agent negotiations over scarce resources.
Introduction
Agent negotiations may be modelled by game-theoretical approaches, heuristic-based approaches or argumentation-based approaches [18] . For obtaining rational explanations as to why agents (have) come to a deal, the last, argumentation-based methods (e.g. [18, 3, 13, 12, 14] ), with their intrinsic strength to handle information in conflict, have been shown to offer some research perspective and direction.
However, the focus of argumentation-based formal approaches has been primarily on bilateral negotiations involving only two parties so far: extension to more general multiagent negotiations is not automatic when demand and supply of scarce resources being negotiated over can change in the middle of a negotiation due to negotiation process interleaving. Consider the following with agents e 1 , e 2 , e 3 .
Suppose the preference of each agent is such that:
e 1 likes to sell both of the Switch consoles. The price per console ($300) is not negotiable. -e 2 likes to obtain two Switch consoles. In case of multiple offers, he chooses the cheapest one. If there is only one seller, his default action is to accept any ask price, except when he cannot afford it, in which case he asks the seller to lower the price to the amount he possesses. -e 3 likes to obtain as many Switch consoles from e 1 for $300 as his budget allows him, and likes to resell them to e 2 for $400 so long as e 2 accepts the deal. He is willing to negotiate over the price if e 2 complains at the ask price. However, he will not lower the price below $300. 
Initial
Step A
Initial Step B
Suppose e 2 and e 3 are the only ones who would visit e 1 for Switch consoles and that both of the consoles would be eventually sold to one of them, the steps indicated in A cover all possible situations that could result. gets(e x , e y , nD) means for e x to get n dollars from e y , gets(e x , e y , nN S) means for e x to get n Nintendo Switch from e y , and negotiates(e x , e y )? means for e x to negotiate over the price of 1 Switch with e y . Initially, either e 2 , as in Initial Step A in A , or e 3 , as in Initial Step B, gets 1 Switch from e 1 for $300. One of the following holds in the end. 4 . e 3 gets 2 Switch from e 1 , and tries to sell them to e 2 for the total price of $800. e 2 gets 1 Switch from e 3 for $400, but for the second Switch, e 2 haggles over the price, to settle at $250, which fails due to e 3 's preference.
Whereas, if a bilateral negotiation can progress uninterrupted till the end, the resource reallocation that the two agents negotiate over will be based on the resource allocation at the inception of the negotiation, a common business negotiation process is often not bound by the tight protocol guaranteeing no interruptions [15, 19] . In the above example, even if e 2 wishes to buy 2 Switch consoles from e 1 as in the situation 1., e 3 may pick up a Switch from a shelf by the time e 2 manages to take one of them, leading to the situation 2. or 3..
The argumentation-based negotiation methodologies considered in the literature, mostly for two-party -and not for interleaved -negotiations, do not immediately scale up to addressing this concurrency issue. To adapt to it, in this work we propose a novel argumentation-based negotiation framework. We base the development on abstract persuasion argumentation (APA) [7] which is a dynamic argumentation formalism that conservatively extends Dung abstract argumentation [10] . It accommodates a dynamic relation called persuasion in addition to attack relation (an argument a 1 attacks an argument a 2 ) of abstract argumentation. Such a relation as: an argument a 1 converts an argument a 2 into another argument a 3 is expressible in APA. Also, it extends the notion of defence against an attack in Dung argumentation to a persuasion. Changes in resource allocation as a result of a successful negotiation can be modelled as a successful persuasion. Failure of a successful negotiation can be modelled as an unsuccessful persuasion, on the other hand.
We introduce the following new features to APA.
-Quantification of arguments: We express a resource as a quantified argument. To describe that there are 2 Nintendo Switch, we will have an argument: there is a Nintendo Switch, to which we assign a numerical value 2 indicating the quantity of the resource.
-Handshakes between persuasions: an agent often tries to obtain a resource from another agent who requires a resource from the first agent in exchange. While the two relations may each be expressed as a persuasion in APA, it has no explicit mechanism to enforce two persuasions to be considered always together for a dynamic transition. As a resolution, we introduce a handshake function.
-Numerical constraints for attacks and persuasions: It matters in negotiation how many (much) of one of the resources are to be exchanged for how many (much) of the other resource. It can also happen that an agent attacks another agent's argument with its argument only under a certain condition. To intuitively express them, we allow both attacks and persuasions to be given numerical constraints.
-Multi-agency: each agent has its own argumentation scope, and may also apply its own criteria to choose acceptable arguments within it. We explicitly introduce the notion of agents into APA.
Key contributions
-Argumentation-based negotiation for interleaved negotiations: As far as we are aware, this is the first negotiation theory in the line of abstract argumentation [10] that adapts to interleaved multi-agent negotiations over scarce resources. -Finer control over dynamic transitions: While APA dynamics is already Turingcomplete [6] , it does not mean that APA's interpretation of transition relation [7] (detail is in section 2.2) can deterministically simulate a handshake of two persuasions for a transition. Numerical APA consolidates the synchronisation, accommodating a finer control over how a dynamic transition takes place. Also, it is rather cumbersome to have to deal with quantities without explicit use of numbers. Numerical APA is an improvement on this aspect. -Explainable preference: In relevant theories (e.g. [3, 13, 12, 14] ), the use of preference relation [8, 2] over arguments to control directionality of the attack (and other) relations is ubiquitous. However, the preference is often external to the underlying argumentation with no concrete explanation given as to what formulates it. In this work, we instead rely upon numerical constraints to achieve conditionalisation of attack (and persuasion) relations. Since they concern quantities of resources, we can understand more explicitly why some attack (persuasion) may not be present.
Related work
Studies around concurrent negotiations are emerging, e.g. [16, 20] . However, the problems we described above with argumentation-based approaches have not been considered in the literature, as far as our awareness goes. Argumentation-based negotiation (Cf. [18] for an early survey) was proposed to obtain rational explanations as to why agents have or have not come to a deal.
In [17] , a kind of agents' interaction during a bilateral negotiation through common goals was studied, under the assumption that there be no resource competition among agents. While we do not explicitly study cooperation among agents in this work, we allow resource competition, as was illustrated early in this section. We further allow interleaving of bilateral negotiations.
In [4, 3] , agents negotiate over potential goals. Say, negotiation is over resource allocation, then each goal describes a possible resource allocation, represented as an argument. At each negotiation turn, new arguments and relations among them (such as attacks and supports) may be inserted into agents' scopes, to assist them make judgement as to which goal(s) should be accepted, with their preferences. There are other studies, e.g. [9] , that focus on some specific aspects of the theoretical framework. These works do not consider interleaved negotiations, however, for which the use of the goal arguments can be in fact problematic, as we are to illustrate later in section 3.1. Also, we approach towards agents' preferences via numerical information, as we described above.
In [12] , a structural argumentation [11] was applied to contract-negotiations, where features express properties of items including quantities. Yet again, it does not cover interleaved negotiations.
In the rest, we will present: technical preliminaries (in Section 2); numerical abstract persuasion argumentation with the above-introduced features (in Section 3); and examples (in Section 4), before drawing conclusions.
2 Technical Preliminaries
Abstract Argumentation
Let A be a class of abstract entities that we understand as arguments, whose member is referred to by a with or without a subscript, and whose finite subset is referred to by A with or without a subscript. A finite argumentation framework is a tuple (A, R) with a binary relation over A [10] . In this work, we assume A = ∅. We denote the set of all finite argumentation frameworks by F.
The following definitions apply to any (A, R) ∈ F. a 1 ∈ A is said to attack a 2 ∈ A if and only if, or iff, (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R. (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R is drawn graphically as a 1 → a 2 . A 1 ⊆ A is said to defend a x ∈ A iff each a y ∈ A attacking a x is attacked by at least one member of A 1 . A 1 ⊆ A is said to be: conflict-free iff no member of A 1 attacks a member of A 1 ; admissible iff it is conflict-free and it defends all the members of A 1 ; complete iff it is admissible and includes any argument it defends; preferred iff it is a set-theoretically maximal admissible set; and grounded iff it is the set intersection of all complete sets of A.
Let Sem be {co, pr, gr}, and let D be Sem × F → 2 2 A . Given a finite argumentation framework (A, R), we denote by D(sem, (A, R)) the set of all (A, R)'s: complete sets iff sem = co; preferred sets iff sem = pr; and grounded sets iff sem = gr. By definition, |D(gr, (A, R))| = 1. There are many other types of semantics, but the three are quite typical semantics related (roughly) by complete sets.
APA: Abstract Persuasion Argumentation
Let 2 (A,R) denote {(A 1 , R 1 ) | A 1 ⊆ A and R 1 = R ∩ (A 1 × A 1 )}. 1 APA [7] is a tuple (A, R, R p , A 0 , →) for A 0 ⊆ A; R p ⊆ A × (A ∪ { }) × A; and →: 2 A × (2 (A,R) × 2 (A,R) ). It extends abstract argumentation (A, R) conservatively. (a 1 , , a 2 ) ∈ R p is drawn graphically as a 1 a 2 ; and (a 1 , a 3 , a 2 ) ∈ R p as a 1 a 3 a1 a 2 . The following definitions apply to any APA tuple (A, R, R p , A 0 , →). Let F (A 1 )
Such A x the transition is dependent upon was termed a reference set in [7] , but to make clearer its association to an agent, we call it an agent set instead. a 1 ∈ A is said to attack a 2 ∈ A in a state F (A 1 ) iff a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 and (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R. For a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A, a 1 is said to be: inducing a 3 in a state F (A 1 ) iff a 1 ∈ A 1 and (a 1 , , a 3 ) ∈ R p ; and converting a 2 into a 3 in F (A 1 ) iff a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 and (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p .
(a 1 , α, a 3 ) ∈ R p for α ∈ A ∪ { } is said to be possible in F (A 1 ) with respect to an agent set A x ⊆ A iff a 1 is either inducing a 3 or converting α into a 3 in F (A 1 ) and a 1 is not attacked by any member of A x in F (A 1 ). The set of all members of R p that are possible in F (A 1 ) with respect to an agent set A x ⊆ A is denoted by Γ Ax F (A1) .
Interpretation of →. The interpretation given of → in [7] is: (1) any subset Γ of Γ Ax F (A1) can be simultaneously considered for transition from
In other words, for
State-wise acceptability semantics.
In [7] , there is another criterion of noelimination:
and a ∈ A b at once (no elimination). Such condition can be made general:
A 1 ⊆ A is said to be: k-step admissible in F (A a ) iff A 1 is conflict-free, proper and defends every member of A 1 in F (A a ) from attacks and k-step eliminations; complete in F (A a ) iff A 1 is admissible and includes every a ∈ A it defends in F (A a ) from attacks and k-step eliminations; preferred in F (A a ) iff A 1 is maximally k-step complete in F (A a ); and grounded in F (A a ) iff it is the set intersection of all k-step complete sets in F (A a ).
In the rest of the paper, we assume k to be always 0, for technical simplicity.
Abstract Argumentation with Agents
In the context of argumentation-based negotiations, it is common to consider argumentation per agent. We can extend abstract argumentation (A, R) with A = ∅ into (A, R, E, f E , f sem ) with: E a set of agents; a function f E : E → (2 A \∅) which is such that, for e 1 , e 2 ∈ E, if e 1 = e 2 , then f E (e 1 ) ∩ f E (e 2 ) = ∅; and f sem : E → Sem. Intuitively, any a ∈ f E (e) is understood to be in the scope of the agent e ∈ E, and each agent e ∈ E has its own semantics f sem (e).
Numerical Abstract Persuasion Argumentation
As per our discussion in Section 1, we extend APA with (1) numerical information, (2) a mechanism of handshakes, and (3) multi-agency. Prior to formally defining the theory, we provide intuition for the first two components through examples.
Numbers and numerical constraints
Numbers and numerical constraints as always are powerful enrichment to a formal system. In the context of this paper, the following are the merits of having them.
Numbers help us better organise scarce resource allocations. Without them, it takes some effort to describe availability of resources in an argument. With goal arguments [4] , each of all possible allocations of resources presently negotiated over is defined as an argument. For example, if e 1 and e 2 commence their negotiations over 2 Switch and $650, the allocation that 2 Switch and $0 are with e 1 and 0 Switch and $650 are with e 2 is one argument a u , while the allocation that 2 Switch and $0 are with e 2 and 0 Switch and $650 are with e 1 is another argument a v , and similarly for all the other possibilities. Bundling together every resource location in one big argument is not necessarily desirable in concurrent multi-agent negotiations, as availability of resources can change in the middle of the negotiation due to interruption by another negotiation, say between e 1 and e 3 . Such a change can entail disappearance of some of resource allocations that were initially feasible. With numbers, the need for maintaining those big arguments is precluded. To describe the idea, we can have an argument There is a Switch. in the scope of e 1 (the argument a 1 ) and an argument There is a Switch. in the scope of e 2 (the argument a 2 ). Similarly, we can have an argument There is a dollar. in the scope of e 1 (the argument a 3 ) and There is a dollar. in the scope of e 2 (the argument a 4 ). Then, we can have a set N a of partial functions A → N mapping an argument for a resource into its quantity in non-negative integer, e.g. n a ∈ N a can be such that n a (a 1 ) = 2 (e 1 has 2 Switch), n a (a 2 ) = 0 (e 2 has 0 Switch), n a (a 3 ) = 0 (e 1 has $0) and n a (a 4 ) = 650 (e 2 has $650).
These numerical information let us infer the earlier-mentioned big argument a u . When there is any change to the quantities of the resources, we can replace n a with another n a 1 ∈ N a which differs from n a in mapping only for those resources (as arguments) affected by it. In the meantime, arguments themselves will stay the same. Making the overall resource allocation an inferrable -rather than hard-coded -information makes adaptation to interleaved negotiations simpler and more intuitive.
Numerical constraints help us express conditional attacks and persuasions. Whether an agent attacks or attempts a persuasion (such as to solicit a concession of an offer) in a state could very well depend on the specific resource allocation in the state. An illustrative example is: e 2 thinks of $300 already too expensive for an electronics device, but, say the money in his possession is $350, at least not so much as him being unable to buy a Switch. Thus, according to his preference (see on the second page of this paper), he is not happy but he does not complain (attack) at the seller for the ask price. This changes clearly when the ask price is $400, since he would not be able to purchase it out of his pocket. There, the chance is that he actually complains (attacks) at the seller.
Numerical constraints can help model this situation intuitively by allowing attacks to conditionally occur. Assume:
-Three arguments: Dollars required. in e 1 's scope (a 1 ); There is a dollar. in e 2 's scope (a 2 ); and That costs a lot. in e 2 's scope (a 3 ). -n a (a 1 ) = n 1 and n a (a 2 ) = n 2 .
-An attack a 3 → a 1 with a numerical constraint n 2 < n 1 given to it.
What these intend is that a 3 attacks a 1 when e 1 's ask price n 1 exceeds dollars n 2 in e 2 's possession. Numerical constraints can be similarly used for a persuasion, not only for an attack.
Whether they are for an attack or a persuasion, constraints may be left unspecified if irrelevant. However, it is rather inflexible to just allow constant numbers in a constraint, since we may like to express a condition: if the quantity of a 1 is greater than that of a 2 , which depends on a chosen n a ∈ N a . We therefore define a formal object for expressing a constraint, its synatx and semantics:
Definition 1 (Constraint objects: syntax). Let Nums, exp, and num with or without a subscript be recognised in the following grammar. We assume n to be a member of N, a to be a member of A, and r to be some (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) with a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A. Any Nums (with or without a subscript) recognised in this grammar is assumed to be a finite set, and is called a constraint object.
Nums := Nums, exp | ∅. exp := num = num | num < num. num := n | a | r.
Let S Nums be the class of all constraint objects, and let g : S Nums → S Nums be such that g(Nums) = Nums iff no a for some a ∈ A or r for some r ∈ A × A × A occurs in Nums. We denote the subclass of S Nums that contains all Nums ∈ S Nums with g(Nums) = Nums but nothing else by S Nums G . We call Nums ∈ S Nums G a ground constraint object.
For the semantics, we define an interpretation function from S Nums to S Nums G . Definition 2 (Interpretation of constraint objects). Let S num denote the set of all distinct num, and let n r : (A × (A ∪ { }) × A) → S num be a partial function such that n r (r), if defined, is some n ∈ N or a for some a ∈ A. Let I t : S num × N a → S num be such that I t (x, n a ) is: x if x ∈ N; n a (a) if x = a; n r (r) if x = r and n r (r) ∈ N; I t (n r (r), n a ) if x = r and n r (r) is a for some a ∈ A; and undefined, otherwise.
Let I : S Nums ×N a → S Nums G be such that I(Nums, n a ) is Nums 1 , where Nums 1 is as the result of replacing every occurrence of x ∈ S num in Nums with I t (x, n a ). I(Nums, n a ) is defined iff I t (x, n a ) is defined for every occurrence of x ∈ S num in Nums.
For any Nums ∈ S Nums and for any n a ∈ N a , we say that I(Nums, n a ) is interpretation of Nums with respect to n a .
Definition 3 (Constraint objects: semantics).
We define a predicate sat : S Nums ×N a → {true, false} to be such that sat(Nums, n a ) iff, for every n 1 < n 2 ∈ I(Nums, n a ), n 2 is greater than n 1 , and for every n 1 = n 2 ∈ I(Nums, n a ), n 1 is equal to n 2 .
The purpose of sat is to judge if the numerical constraints in Nums ∈ S Nums are satisfied for a given n a ∈ N a .
Numbers help us express the quantity needed of a resource for a dynamic transition. Suppose e 2 has $650, and that e 1 tries to obtain $300 from e 2 . After a successful transaction, e 2 's budget decreases, not to 0, however. This scenario is not concisely expressed in APA: if (1) {(a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )} = R p , (2) both a 1 and a 2 are visible in a state (see Section 2), and (3) (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) is possible in the state, then in the next state a 2 is invisible. However, with numbers, suppose:
-Three arguments: Dollars required. in e 1 's scope (a 1 ); There is a dollar. in e 2 's scope (a 2 ); and There is a dollar. in e 1 's scope (a 3 ). -n a (a 2 ) = 650 and n a (a 3 ) = 0.
-(a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p , with n r assigning 300 to (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ), i.e. n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) = 300, signifying how many dollars e 1 will require.
Then the conversion (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ), provided it is possible in a given state, will update n a to n a 1 ∈ N a such that n a 1 (a 2 ) = 350; and n a 1 (a 3 ) = 300, without mandatorily eliminating a 2 .
Handshakes among persuasion relations
Suppose: Dollar required. in the scope of e 1 (argument a 1 ); There is a dollar. in the scope of e 2 (argument a 2 ); There is a dollar. in the scope of e 1 (argument a 3 ); Switch required. in the scope of e 2 (argument a 4 ); There is a Switch. in the scope of e 1 (argument a 5 ); and There is a Switch. in the scope of e 2 (argument a 6 ).
Suppose the following two persuasions over them: one is (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ), another is (a 4 , a 5 , a 6 ). To enforce a handshake between them, we introduce a function hs : R p → 2 Rp such that (1) if r 2 ∈ hs(r 1 ), then r 1 ∈ hs(r 2 ), and that (2) if hs(r 1 ) = ∅, then it is not considered for transition unless there is some r 2 ∈ hs(r 1 ) that is considered for transition simultaneously with it (see Section 2 for what it means for a persuasion to be considered for transition). The interpretation of |hs(r 2 )| > 1 is that r 2 may be considered together with a member (and not all the members) of hs(r 2 ).
Numerical Abstract Persuasion Argumentation
Denote the class of all partial functions (A × (A ∪ { }) × A) → S num by N r , every member of which is such that, if defined, the output is some n ∈ N or a for some a ∈ A.
Definition 4 (Numerical Abstract Persuasion Argumentation). We define a Numerical Abstract Persuasion Argumentation (Numerical APA) to be a tuple (A, R, R p , E, f E , f sem , A 0 , hs, ⇒, n a 0 , n r , cst), with: (1) hs :
All the others, i.e. A, R, R p , E, f E , f sem and A 0 are as defined in Section 2, i.e.
The following definitions apply to any Numerical APA (A, R, R p , E, f E , f sem , A 0 , hs, ⇒ , n a 0 , n r , cst). Definition 5 (States). Let F (A 1 , n a 1 ) for some A 1 ⊆ A and some n a 1 ∈ N a denote ((A 1 , R ∩ (A 1 × A 1 )), n a 1 ). We call any such F (A 1 , n a 1 ) a (Numerical APA) state. We call F (A 0 , n a 0 ) the initial state in particular. In any state F (A x , n a x ), we say any member of A
Exactly how ⇒ is interpreted is left unspecified at this point, which will be detailed later in section 3.7.
Restrictions
In this work, we will restrict our attention to a subset of all Numerical APA tuples. Specifically, 1. We divide A into arguments that denote resources, and the other arguments as ordinary arguments. We assume that no resource arguments become ordinary arguments, or vice versa via state transitions. 2. We assume any resource argument with quantity 0 is invisible. In particular, there is no a ∈ A 0 such that n a 0 (a) = 0. 3. We assume that n r ∈ N r does not update by dynamic transitions. This seems reasonable, however, since R p and updates on n a together easily simulate updates on n r . 4. We assume that n r is defined at most for members of R p that are conversions.
We assume that n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) for (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p with a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A is defined iff a 2 and a 3 are a resource argument. This is for our intended purpose, that n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) represents the number (amount) of resources a 1 asks of from a 2 which changes the number (amount) of resources a 3 . We further assume that if n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) for (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p is defined, then for every a 4 , a 5 ∈ A, if (a 4 , a 2 , a 5 ) ∈ R p , then n r ((a 4 , a 2 , a 5 )) is defined and vice versa.
Formal definitions follow.
Definition 6 (Resource and ordinary arguments). We say that a ∈ A is a resource argument in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff n a 1 (a) is defined. We say that a ∈ A is an ordinary argument in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff a is not a resource argument in F (A 1 , n a 1 ).
Definition 7 (Type rigidity). We say that A is type rigid iff for every F (A x , n a x ), a ∈ A is a resource argument in F (A 0 , n a 0 ) iff a is a resource argument in F (A x , n a x ).
Definition 8 (Normal relations). We say that R p is normal iff for every F (A 1 , n a 1 ):
for every (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p with a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A, I t (n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )), n a 1 ) is defined iff a 2 and a 3 are a resource argument in F (A 1 , n a 1 ). -If I t (n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )), n a 1 ) for (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p is defined, then for any a 4 , a 5 ∈ A, (a 4 , a 2 , a 5 ) ∈ R p iff I t (n r ((a 4 , a 2 , a 5 )), n a 1 ) is defined.
In the rest, we assume a restricted class of Numerical APA tuples with type-rigid A and normal R p , and which are moreover such that n r remains constant through state transitions.
Attacks and persuasions
Some attacks and persuasions may not satisfy constraint objects attached to them in a state, in which case we simply ignore their influence in the state, as embodied in:
Definition 9 (Constraint-adjusted relations). We say:
-R is an attack relation constraint-adjusted in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff R = {(a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R ∩ (A 1 × A 1 ) | sat(cst((a 1 , a 2 )), n a 1 )}.
-R p is a persuasion relation constraint-adjusted in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff all the three conditions 1., 2. and 3. hold good for every r ∈ R p .
1. If r ≡ (a 1 , , a 3 ) for some a 1 , a 3 ∈ A, then a 1 ∈ A 1 and sat(cst(r), n a 1 ). 2. If r ≡ (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) for some a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A, then a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 and sat(cst(r), n a 1 ). 3. There exists no R p such that R p ⊂ R p and that R p satisfies both of the conditions 1. and 2. above.
We denote the attack relation constraint-adjusted in
We use the constraint-adjusted relations to characterise attacks and persuasions in a state.
Definition 10 (Attacks and persuasions in a state). We say a 1 ∈ A attacks a 2 ∈ A in a state F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ f R (F (A 1 , n a 1 )). We say a 1 ∈ A is inducing a 2 ∈ A in a state F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff (a 1 , , a 2 ) ∈ f Rp (F (A 1 , n a 1 )). We say a 1 ∈ A is converting a 2 ∈ A to a 3 ∈ A in a state F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ f Rp (F (A 1 , n a 1 )).
State-wise agent semantics
We say A 1 ⊆ A is conflict-free in F (A a , n a a ) iff no member of A 1 attacks a member of A 1 in F (A a , n a a ). We say A 1 ⊆ A defends a ∈ A in F (A a , n a a ) from attacks iff, if a ∈ A a , then every a u ∈ A a attacking a in F (A a , n a a ) is attacked by at least one member of A 1 in F (A a , n a a ). We say A 1 ⊆ A is proper in F (A a , n a a ) iff A 1 ⊆ A a . As was stated in Section 2, in this work we will not deal with defence from eliminations. With this simplification, each agent semantics in a given state is knowable without consideration over dynamic transitions.
Definition 11 (State-wise agent admissibility). We say that A 1 ⊆ A is: admissible in F (A a , n a a ) for e ∈ E iff A 1 ⊆ f E (e) and A 1 is conflict-free and A 1 is proper and A 1 defends every member of A 1 from attacks in F (A a , n a a ); complete in F (A a , n a a ) for e ∈ E iff A 1 is admissible in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) for e and A 1 includes every a ∈ f E (e) it defends from attacks in F (A a , n a a ); preferred in F (A a , n a a ) for e ∈ E iff A 1 is a maximal complete set in F (A a , n a a ) for e; and grounded in F (A a , n a a ) for e ∈ E iff A 1 is the set intersection of all complete sets in F (A a , n a a ) for e.
Together with the choice of a semantic type f sem (e) by each agent e ∈ E, we obtain:
For every F (A 1 , n a 1 ) and every e ∈ E, we call S(A 1 , n a 1 , e) e's semantics in F (A 1 , n a 1 ).
Interpretation of ⇒
As in APA (see Section 2), we then characterise possible persuasions with respect to some agent set.
Definition 13 (Possible persuasions). (a 1 , α, a 2 ) ∈ R p for α ∈ A ∪ { } is said to be possible in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) with respect to an agent set A x ⊆ A iff there is some e 1 ∈ E such that A x ∈ S(A 1 , n a 1 , e 1 ) (note that A x may be an empty set; see Section 2) and a 1 is either inducing a 2 or converting α into a 2 in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) and a 1 is not attacked by any member of A x in F (A 1 , n a 1 ). We denote by Γ Ax F (A1,n a 1 ) the set of all members of R p that are possible in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) with respect to an agent set A x ⊆ A. There may be more than one agent in a Numerical APA; some persuasions must always be together due to hs; and, on the other hand, some persuasions cannot be together due to the quantity change of a resource otherwise going below 0. We thus obtain a multi-agent version of Definition 13:
Definition 14 (Multi-agent possible persuasions). We say that A x ⊆ A is a multiagent union set in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) iff (A x ∩ f E (e)) ∈ S(A 1 , n a 1 , e) for every e ∈ E.
(Explanation: every agent may have more than one set of arguments in its semantics in F (A 1 , n a 1 ). While any one of them may be chosen by the agent, not two distinct ones can they choose at the same time. Therefore, when we obtain the set union of one member of every agent's semantics, it should trivially hold that the set intersection of the union set and f E (e) is a member of e's semantics in F (A 1 , n a 1 ).)
is a multi-agent possible persuasion set in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) with respect to A x iff both of the following conditions hold:
1. For every r 1 ∈ Λ, if hs(r 1 ) = ∅, then there exists one and only one r 2 ∈ hs(r 1 ) such that
returns the set of conversions in Γ on a, and inc(A 1 , n a 1 , Γ, a) returns the set of conversions in Γ that induce a.)
A multi-agent union set defined above involves every e ∈ E, to express defence by every agent against dynamic transitions with the set of arguments it chooses. Finally:
Definition 15 (Interpretation of ⇒). We define: F (A 1 , n a 1 ) ⇒ Ax F (A 2 , n a 2 ) iff (1) A x is a multi-agent union set and (2) there is some multi-agent possible persuasion set Λ in F (A 1 , n a 1 ) with respect to A x such that: -n a 2 (a) = n a 1 (a)+Σ r∈inc(A1,n a 1 ,Λ,a) I t (n r (r), n a 1 )−Σ r∈dec(A1,n a 1 ,Λ,a) I t (n r (r), n a 1 ) for every resource argument a ∈ A.
-Let neg(Λ) and pos(Λ) be:
Example Modelling of Concurrent Multi-Agent Negotiations
We illustrate Numerical APA with our running example. We assume the following graphical conventions in all figures.
a ∈ A is generally drawn as a. As an exception, for a ∈ A with a defined n a 1 (a) in F (A 1 , n a 1 ), it may be drawn more specifically as n a 1 (a) : a, or as in any form that puts the quantity before the argument.
-A visible argument is bordered, an argument that is not visible is not bordered.
-(a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R with cst((a 1 , a 2 )) = Nums is drawn as a 1 Nums − −− → a 2 . Nums may be omitted if Nums = ∅, and brackets to indicate a set of constraints may be omitted if it is a singleton set.
Nums a 3 . Nums may be omitted if Nums = ∅, and brackets may be omitted if it is a singleton set. -(a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ R p with cst((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) = Nums and a defined n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) =
Nums may be omitted if Nums = ∅, and brackets may be omitted if it is a singleton set. If n r ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )) is not defined, then x is not stated.
Let us reflect back on the negotiation example of Section 1, more specifically on the stage of the negotiation in A right after Initial Step B (e 1 gives 1 Switch to e 3 for $300) is taken. There are 16 arguments in total that appear in at least one of the 3 figures below. Out of them, a 12−16 are e 1 's arguments, a 7−11 are e 2 's arguments, and a 1−6 are e 3 's arguments. B , C , and D represent an argumentation-based bilateral negotiation for e 3 (left column)-e 2 (right column), e 1 (left column)-e 2 (right column), and e 1 (left column)-e 3 (right column), respectively. Some attacks and persuasions may not be drawn in those figures if they are not contained within the bilateral negotiation. Formally, they represent the following Numerical APA. What exactly Nums 1 , Nums 2 and Nums 4 in B and C are are also stated below. -A ≡ {a1, . . . , a16}. {(a2, a9, a4) , (a3, a9, a4), (a7, a2, a3), (a8, , a7), (a10, a5, a11), (a7, a13, a14), (a13, a9, a15), (a14, a9, a15), (a10, a16, a11), (a13, a4, a15), (a6, a16, a5 -⇒ is as per section 3.7.
n a 0 (a4) = 300, n a 0 (a5) = 1, n a 0 (a9) = 650, n a 0 (a11) = 0, n a 0 (a15) = 300, n a 0 (a16) = 1. n a 0 is not defined for the other arguments. -n r ((a2, a9, a4)) = 400, n r ((a3, a9, a4)) = a9, n r ((a10, a5, a11)) = 1, n r ((a13, a9, a15)) = 300, n r ((a14, a9, a15)) = a9, n r ((a10, a16, a11)) = 1, n r ((a13, a4, a15 )) = 300, n r ((a6, a16, a5)) = 1. n r is not defined for any other members of Rp.
cst((a1, a7)) = { a9 < 300}.
cst((a8, a2, a3)) = Nums2 = { a9 < (a2, a9, a4), (a2, a9, a4) < (a13, a9, a15)}. cst((a8, a13, a14)) = Nums4 = { a9 < (a13, a9, a15), (a13, a9, a15) < (a2, a9, a4)}. cst((a11, a10)) = {1 < a11}. cst((a8, , a7)) = Nums1 = { a9 < (a13, a9, a15), a9 < (a2, a9, a4)}.
Preference as quantities and numerical constraints. Both e 1 and e 3 are trying to sell 1 Nintendo Switch console that they each have to e 2 , see (a 13 , a 9 , a 15 ) ∈ R p in C for e 1 -e 2 negotiation and (a 2 , a 9 , a 4 ) ∈ R p in B for e 3 -e 2 negotiation. According to the preference spelled out in Section 1 (on the second page), e 2 chooses the cheapest offer. The preference is enforced in the constraint on the attack a 8 → a 13 , i.e. Nums 4 ( C ), and that on the attack a 8 → a 2 , i.e. Nums 2 ( B ). Specifically, (a 2 , a 9 , a 4 ) < (a 13 , a 9 , a 15 ) in Nums 2 dictates that e 2 complains at e 1 of her ask price and does not consider the deal if e 3 's ask price is lower. Similarly, (a 13 , a 9 , a 15 ) < (a 2 , a 9 , a 4 ) in Nums 4 dictates that e 2 complains at e 3 of his ask price and does not consider the deal if e 1 's ask price is lower.
Non-deterministic dynamic transitions for concurrent multi-agent negotiations. As in the steps indicated in A , in this state, either e 2 or e 3 , but not both of them, may obtain a Switch from e 1 (see C for e 1 -e 2 negotiation, and D for e 1 -e 3 negotiation). The reason that they cannot both obtain a Switch from e 1 is due to (Resource-safety) of Definition 14, since I t ((a 10 , a 16 , a 11 ), n a 0 ) + I t ((a 6 , a 16 , a 5 ), n a 0 ) = 2 which is strictly greater than n a 0 (a 16 ) = 1. However, otherwise, either (a 10 , a 16 , a 11 ) and (a 13 , a 9 , a 15 ) or else (a 6 , a 16 , a 5 ) and (a 13 , a 4 , a 15 ) may be considered together for a dynamic transition in F (A 0 , n a 0 ). To wit, observe: {(a13, a4, a15), (a6, a16, a5), (a13, a9, a15) , (a10, a16, a11), (a2, a9, a4), (a10, a5, a11 {(a13, a4, a15), (a6, a16, a5), (a13, a9, a15) , (a10, a16, a11), (a2, a9, a4), (a10, a5, a11)}.
(a 10 , a 16 , a 11 ) and (a 13 , a 9 , a 15 ), as well as (a 6 , a 16 , a 5 ) and (a 13 , a 4 , a 15 ), satisfy (Handshake-compatibility) and (Resource-safety).
Haggling and concession. Let us think of a scenario where e 2 gets a Switch console from e 1 before e 3 does. The negotiation state F (A 0 , n a 0 ) transitions to the next state F (A 1 , n a 1 ), for which we have graphical representation of B' , C' , and D' from B , C , and D . A 1 denotes {a 1−2,4−6,8−11,12−13,15 } with a 1,2,... abbreviating a 1 , a 2 , . . . and a i−j abbreviating a i , a i+1 , . . . , a j . Meanwhile, n a 1 is such that n a 1 (a 9 ) = 350 (re-2 You better lower the price.
That costs a lot.
350
There is a dollar. duced from 650 by e 2 paying 300 to e 1 ), that n a 1 (a 11 ) = 1 (increased from 0 by e 2 obtaining 1 Switch from e 1 ), that n a 1 (a 15 ) = 600 (increased from 300 by e 1 obtaining 300 from e 2 ), and that n a 1 (a 16 ) = 0 (reduced from 1 by e 1 selling 1 Switch to e 2 ), while all the other values are unchanged from those with n a 0 . At this point, e 2 may only obtain a Switch from e 3 . The ask price of a Switch, however, is 400 dollars from e 3 , and e 2 only has 350 dollars. See B' for e 3 -e 2 bilateral negotiation. According to e 2 's preference (find it on the second page), e 2 asks e 3 to lower the ask price to 350 dollars. That e 2 decides to negotiate over the price with e 3 is characterised in a 8 Nums1 a 7 a 2 a7 a 3 , and by the facts that n r ((a 3 , a 9 , a 4 )) = a 9 , and that I t ( a 9 , n a 1 ) = 350. Since a 8 is visible in F (A 1 , n a 1 ), sat(Nums 1 , n a 1 ) (i.e. 350 < 400), and no a ∈ A 1 attacks a 8 in F (a 1 , n a 1 ), there is a transition from F (A 1 , n a 1 ) into F (A 2 , n a 1 ) with A 2 = A 1 ∪ {a 7 }. In this state, e 2 is trying to convert e 3 's a 2 with n r ((a 2 , a 9 , a 4 )) = 400 into a 3 with n r ((a 3 , a 9 , a 4 )) = a 9 which is basically 350 in F (A 2 , n a 1 ), since I t ( a 9 , n a 1 ) = 350. Now, the conversion is not automatic in all states, because of a 1 a4<300 −→ a 7 . As per e 3 's preference (find it on the second page), in case e 2 tries to lower the price below 300 dollars, e 3 simply refuses the request. In F (A 2 , n a 1 ), however, I t ( a 4 , n a 1 ) = 350, thus e 3 agrees to lower the ask price of a Switch from 400 dollars to 350 dollars, which results in another transition from F (A 2 , n a 1 ) into F ((A 2 \{a 2 }) ∪ {a 3 }, n a 1 ).
Conclusion
We developed a novel numerical argumentation-based negotiation theory from a dynamic abstract argumentation APA, and illustrated its mechanism, explaining in particular how it deals with preference and negotiation process interleaving. The following research problems in the literature were alleviated or solved by our theory.
1. Often unexplained origin of preference: compared to the traditional preference that is assumed to be provided from some external source, in Numerical APA, whether there are or are not any attacks between arguments is controlled by some numerical values within a given Numerical APA argumentation framework. While we did not explicitly deal with attack-reversing preference [5] , with which an attack on a more preferred argument is reversed of its direction, that, too, can be readily handled with numerical conditionalisation. 2. Difficulty in handling resource arguments: by quantification of an argument, any potentially diminishing (or strengthening) argument is now intuitively expressed. 3. Difficulty in dealing with synchronisation: the handshake mechanism of Numerical APA can be used for this issue.
Difficulty in handling interleaved negotiations:
Numerical APA is an extension of APA which can handle concurrency. Further, resource allocation is an inferable, instead of hard-coded, information in Numerical APA, which adapts well to modelling concurrent negotiations.
As immediate future work, we have two agendas. First, the ability to reason about gametheoretical properties in agent-negotiation is desirable. While agents' preferences about the conditions under which to permit a resource reallocation may be expressed by means of numerical information, an inference system will be required for judging whether a certain specific resource allocation optimal to a group of agents is reachable. To this end, we consider embedding of this theory into ATL [1] , in a similar manner to CTL embedding shown in [7] . Second, we consider relaxation of some assumptions made about Numerical APA. For instance, collaboration among agents may be permitted. It should be interesting to see how different types of agent interactions can influence the overall negotiation outcomes. Also, while in this work we did not take into account defence from k-step eliminations for an arbitrary k, any positive value for k reflects agent's foresight to grasp steps ahead in negotiation, which should influence its decision-making.
